The goal of a signcryption scheme is to achieve the same functionalities as encryption and signature together, but in a more efficient way than encrypting and signing separately. To increase security and reliability in some applications, the unsigncryption phase can be distributed among a group of users, through a (t, n)-threshold process. In this work we consider this task of threshold unsigncryption, which has received very few attention from the cryptographic literature up to now (maybe surprisingly, due to its potential applications). First we describe in detail the security requirements that a scheme for such a task should satisfy: existential unforgeability and indistinguishability, under insider chosen message/ciphertext attacks, in a multi-user setting. Then we show that generic constructions of signcryption schemes (by combining encryption and signature schemes) do not offer this level of security in the scenario of threshold unsigncryption. For this reason, we propose two new protocols for threshold unsigncryption, which we prove to be secure, one in the random oracle model and one in the standard model. The two proposed schemes enjoy an additional property that can be very useful. Namely, the unsigncryption protocol can be divided in two phases: a first one where the authenticity of the ciphertext is verified, maybe by a single party; and a second one where the ciphertext is decrypted by a subset of t receivers, without using the identity of the sender. As a consequence, the schemes can be used in applications requiring some level of anonymity, such as electronic auctions.
Introduction
By encrypting or signing messages, digital communications may achieve some well-known properties: confidentiality, authentication, integrity or/and non-repudiation. When all these properties are required at the same time, there are more efficient solutions than signing and encrypting each message separately. Cryptographic schemes that provide the same properties than encryption and signature together receive the name of signcryption schemes [27] (or also authenticated encryption schemes [2]). Such schemes consist of a key generation protocol, a signcryption protocol run by the sender of the message (which uses his secret key and the public key of the receiver to hide and authenticate the message) and an unsigncryption protocol run by the receiver (which uses his secret key and the public key of the sender to recover the message and verify its authenticity).
Since the invention of this concept in 1997, many papers discussing different security properties and proposing new signcryption schemes have appeared. In particular, there are some generic constructions [1] of signcryption schemes, combining signature and encryption schemes, that achieve a very high level of security: unforgeability under chosen message attacks and plaintext indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks, against an insider adversary in a multi-user setting.
Most of the papers dealing with signcryption consider individual entities to perform the secret tasks of signcryption and unsigncryption. In many real-life situations, centralizing a secret task is not desirable due to both security and reliability reasons (a security / technical problem at a single entity can cause important threats / delays to the system). In these cases, a common approach is to decentralize the secret task(s) by considering a group of n entities, in such a way that the cooperation of at least t of them is necessary to successfully finish the task. This approach is known as (t, n)-threshold cryptography. In the scenario of signcryption, there are two secret tasks, so threshold cryptography could be applied to the signcryption protocol, to the unsigncryption protocol, or to both of them.
Among these three possibilities, here we focus on the situation where the unsigncryption task is distributed among a set of entities through a (t, n)-threshold process. Such schemes are known as threshold unsigncryption schemes. For simplicity we consider that the signcryption protocol is run by an individual entity (see however Sect. 9 for a discussion on fully threshold signcryption). We want to stress that the primitive of threshold unsigncryption is not just of theoretical interest; it has applications in real-life scenarios. For example, in a digital auction system, bidders may send their authenticated private bids, encrypted with the public key of a set of servers. In this way, even if some dishonest servers (less than t) collude, they will not be able to obtain information about the bids and influence the result of the auction. At the end of the auction, a large enough number of servers will cooperate to decrypt the bids and determine the winner of the auction and the price to pay.
The first works that focused on threshold unsigncryption [12] [13] [14] 25, 26] failed to achieve the desired security properties for this kind of schemes: existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks, and plaintext indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), in a multi-user setting where the adversary can be insider and can corrupt up to t − 1 members of the target receiver entity. These security properties, along with the syntactic definition of threshold unsigncryption schemes, are detailed in Sect. 3. The security weaknesses of the above-mentioned threshold unsigncryption schemes were pointed out in [10, 20] . We showed in [10] (and we include this in Sect. 4 of this paper, for completeness) that even
